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and the Treaties of Rome
Brian Shaev
Revisiting socialist debates on the Treaties of Rome 
(1957) opens a window onto early conceptions of 
the potential of a European common market – and 
Labour’s capitulation to the sovereigntist dogmas of 
late-imperial Britain.
It has become fashionable in the last decade for scholars such as Wolfgang Streeck to associate the Treaties of Rome that created the European Economic Community (EEC) with Friedrich Hayek, the neoliberal thinker and proponent of 
European economic federation. Yet Hayek had no direct, nor arguably any indirect, 
role in the Treaties. Three of the six governments that negotiated these Treaties were 
led by socialist, social-democratic and labour parties, and a socialist party was in a 
cabinet coalition in a fourth. The Treaties of Rome also gained the backing of the 
German Social Democratic Party (SPD), then in opposition. The reasons for this 
initial socialist embrace of European integration have dropped out of contemporary 
debates on the future of Europe, particularly in the English-speaking world. This 
article reconstructs the historic reasons for the continental left’s support for 
European integration. It also details some of the conflicts opened up by the British 
Labour Party’s repeated and vocal objections to the idea of a European polity enjoying 
a measure of supranational authority over its member states.
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British Labour and European socialism
It is no secret that UK Labour Party leaders were critical of most European 
integration initiatives in the 1940s and 1950s, although there were also prominent 
Labour supporters of UK membership of the EEC. Labour’s reasoning and 
rhetoric are difficult to identify as strictly socialist. The party’s discourses blended 
socialist ideas with positions held by Conservative and Liberal politicians, particu-
larly concerning foreign trade interests, historical narratives of the ‘English 
constitution’, attitudes inherited from the UK’s victory in the Second World War, 
and, perhaps most importantly, an attachment to the Commonwealth as an 
alternative vehicle for internationalist ambitions.
The debate among socialist parties regarding the prospects for European political 
and economic integration began during the Second World War. After the war a 
socialist clash emerged on international economic institutions, in 1948-50, reflect-
ing a French-Belgian vs. British dispute over the principle of supranationalism. By 
the mid-1950s, the pro-integration French socialist (SFIO) position had broadly 
been taken up by key actors in the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) and the German 
SPD. There was a growing continental socialist consensus that European integra-
tion was necessary for economic prosperity, for international peace, and for 
building positive forms of integration to mitigate the negative consequences of 
regional trade liberalisation. This consensus increasingly clashed with anti-capital-
ist rhetoric and other criticisms of the European communities emerging from 
Scandinavia and the UK. Here we capture a few snapshots of this inter-socialist 
dialogue, focusing on the fraught question of the balance of liberalism and social-
ism in the economic constitution of early European integration. 
To do so, we focus on the views of the continental socialists who were the most 
engaged in the European project: members of the Socialist Group of the European 
Common Assembly/Parliamentary Assembly, the predecessor of today’s European 
Parliament. These were politicians delegated by national parliaments whom we 
would expect to favour European integration. As Talbot Imlay writes in his history 
of socialist internationalism, ‘the Strasbourg Assembly quickly became a central 
site for the practice of socialist internationalism on the issue of European unity’.1 It 
is well known that continental socialist parties were keen to have the UK join the 
European Communities. Yet they were also – and with good reason – concerned 
about the potential impact of British membership on their own visions of European 
integration. 
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Free trade or Common Market?
During the negotiations of the Treaties of Rome, a vigorous transnational debate 
unfolded over the philosophical bases and potential of a European common market. 
The European Economic Community, most Labour leaders asserted, would remove 
the ability of a Labour-led government to build socialism in Britain and deprive the 
British people of the sovereignty they had earned over centuries of parliamentary 
representation. The response to this by Labour’s allies on the continent intersected 
directly with debates surrounding a 1956 proposal for a Free Trade Area (FTA), a 
British-inspired complement (or alternative) to the EEC, and the predecessor of 
today’s European Free Trade Area (EFTA). 
The FTA proposal excluded agriculture, which directly contradicted French designs 
for regional trade. As a comparatively simple free trade agreement, offering little 
capacity for positive economic coordination between member states, this was a 
greater cause of concern to continental socialists than the potential challenges 
posed by British membership in the EEC. As a bridgehead for Anglo-liberalism 
into European trade politics, it threatened to destroy the kernels of socialism they 
saw in the EEC Treaty.
In November 1955, John Edwards, a Labour MP, met with Socialist Group members 
to discuss a Labour position paper on European integration. Edwards found himself 
facing totally contrasting interpretations of what liberalism and socialism meant in 
an increasingly interdependent world and in the context of post-war European 
integration. In his opening remarks, he told his international colleagues that, ‘the 
danger consists in the fact that Socialists in Europe too often affirm certain things 
that could also, and with more conviction, be affirmed by others, notably by liberals’. 
Edwards’s statements bring us to the crux of the matter: the liberal vs. socialist 
content of the envisioned European common market. Gerard Nederhorst, a promi-
nent Dutch labour politician, responded at length to Edwards. First, he asked 
whether Edwards supported free trade. He expected a positive response since this 
was anyway the goal of the Organisation of European Economic Co-operation 
(OEEC), which the UK had helped build under Clement Attlee’s government. 
Edwards replied affirmatively – but simultaneously referred to the sovereignty of the 
British government as embodied in parliament. 
His premise confirmed, Nederhorst presented a socialist interpretation of the 
common market. If one accepts free trade, does this imply its automatic execution 
without regard to its consequences? Then he argued that the automatic execution of 
free trade, without any regard to consequences, ‘would return us to the most 
absolute liberalism of the nineteenth century’. Rather, socialists must insist on 
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‘safeguards’ to mitigate any negative social effects arising from liberalising markets, 
and also on economic ‘planning’. 
With this logic Nederhorst attacked Labour’s insistence on unanimity in interna-
tional organisations. Unanimity – hence ‘intergovernmentalism’ rather than 
qualified majority voting (the ‘Community principle’) – would destroy socialists’ 
efforts to construct community policies to mitigate the negative consequences of 
lowering trade barriers, because it would probably be impossible to get unanimous 
agreement on safeguarding measures. It would therefore leave intact the freer trade 
socialists supported, but remove from their hands the possibility of building 
socialist policies at the European level. As for building socialism in one nation, 
Nederhorst’s Dutch colleague Paul Kapteyn argued that ‘not one of the European 
nations can carry out’ on its own an economic and social policy capable, in the long 
term, of ensuring full employment and economic security.2
Over the next two years, these differences sharpened, as European governments 
signed the Treaties of Rome, followed quickly by successful parliamentary ratifica-
tions among ‘the Six’. The Conservative UK government withdrew from the 
negotiations in late 1955 and proposed an industrial Free Trade Area that would 
include the European community member states and non-member states. It is likely 
that the FTA proposal began as a failed attempt to scuttle the common market 
negotiations.3 Certainly, the German social-democratic leadership saw matters this 
way. The SPD’s perception of British obstructionism pushed the party towards 
supporting the Treaties of Rome – the first time it had supported European integra-
tion treaties since WWII.4 Meanwhile, an international socialist debate to define the 
ideological content of a European common market continued. Nederhorst asserted 
in a European parliamentary committee that, ‘there exists an essential difference 
between liberalisation and integration’: integration initiatives sought to harmonise 
economic policies and build common institutions to promote macroeconomic 
policy-making, while liberalisation did not.5 
A colonial project?
There was also a colonial dimension to the Treaties of Rome. Particular critical 
attention has been given to the disastrous colonial policies of French socialist prime 
minister Guy Mollet – who was a key actor in the Treaties of Rome, the Suez War 
and the mass state violence of the Algerian War.6 Some left-wing critics have 
emphasised this in order to denounce the neo-colonial nature of European integra-
tion from its very beginnings. But the picture is more complex than this would 
suggest. On the one hand, Mollet did successfully argue for the EEC to include a 
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development fund for European overseas territories, and for special association 
status for former colonial territories in the EEC Treaty; on the other, it is almost 
certain that it was not his government’s Suez humiliation nor the Algerian War that 
determined Mollet’s support for the Common Market. Nevertheless, these (neo)colo-
nial features so troubled the SPD that some German social democrats decided to 
vote against the entire treaty. In the end the treaties formally eschewed direct EEC 
involvement or financing in the Algerian War, and this won over most of their 
wavering SPD comrades. 
In France, hard-line supporters of French Algeria on the SFIO’s right wing, who had 
a direct hand in waging the Algerian War, were generally those most sceptical of 
European integration (viewing it as an obstacle to French Union). The left wing of 
the party was the most hostile to colonialism, but supportive of European integra-
tion and the Treaties of Rome. There were even prominent advocates of a Eurafrican 
community among representatives of the French overseas territories, in particular 
from West and Central Africa.7 
Before the calamitous violence of the Algerian War led to a party schism, the SFIO 
centre (around party leader Mollet) and the SFIO left both agreed that larger 
economic units, (con)federations or ‘grands ensembles’ were necessary for France 
as well as for France’s colonies. They hoped that they could find a pathway out of 
colonialism without turning to a ‘reactionary’ form of national sovereignty, though 
such hopes were dashed after it became clear that the Algerian revolutionaries 
would support nothing short of independence.8 In such a complex political context, 
one cannot simply equate socialist support in the 1950s for European integration 
with French colonialism.
Back to the jungle
That the EEC Treaty created a common market, rather than just a customs union or 
a free trade area, allowed pro-European integration socialists to argue that the 
common market was the only means to realise a socialist economic policy agenda. 
A German social democrat, Joachim Schöne, noted that the EEC Treaty ‘certainly 
has some holes’ in it, but it was ‘good enough if we have the good will of those 
involved to pursue an active economic policy oriented in a socialist sense’. What 
the Socialist Group should strive for, he said, was ‘a well-organised market’, 
blending together here old SPD discourses of ‘organised capitalism’ and SFIO 
preferences for ‘organised trade’. Another SPD deputy, Heinrich Deist, agreed. He 
also ‘had the impression that socialists have a tendency to adopt a much too liberal 
conception of free trade’;9 but he rejected characterising the EEC treaty as ‘neolib-
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eral’, arguing that, ‘it includes sufficient possibilities to lead a progressive policy if 
one has the will and the force’. The Belgian socialist René Evalenko claimed that 
the Treaty’s ban on state aid (with exceptions), one of the economic aspects to 
which the Labour Party objected, would be ‘substituted by a dynamic economic 
policy’ of supranational executive bodies.10 John Edwards, for his part, announced 
that the Labour Party, under certain conditions, would support the Free Trade Area 
but not the EEC.11 
In summer 1957, as ratifications of the Treaties of Rome were concluding in 
continental Europe, Aneurin Bevan launched a broadside in a Tribune article titled 
‘Back to Free Markets – and the Jungle’. In it he wrote that under the EEC Treaty, 
the market would be ‘endowed with the sacrosanctity of a totem’. Free competition 
and economic planning, he argued, were mutually exclusive. Perhaps most damn-
ingly, he wrote that the Common Market was ‘an escapist conception’ resulting from 
the ‘political malaise following upon the failure of [continental] Socialists to use the 
sovereign power of their Parliament[s] to plan their economic life’. 
Bevan’s article did little to endear Labour to its continental colleagues. In internal 
meetings in autumn 1957, PvdA deputy Marinus van der Goes van Naters called it 
‘false’, arguing that, ‘The EEC contains the possibility of putting in place dirigiste 
ideas’. Moreover, the Socialist Group viewed the negotiations that were gathering 
pace for a European FTA, which the Labour Party supported, albeit unenthusiasti-
cally, as the real threat to socialism. 
In October-November 1957 the Socialist Group laid out detailed criticisms in private 
of the threat posed by the FTA to socialist policies. These are especially noteworthy 
considering that their parties otherwise supported an agreement between the EEC 
and countries proposing the FTA. In effect, these socialists redeployed elements of 
Labour’s critique of the Common Market against the FTA. Nederhorst said that, ‘the 
Socialist Group must be on guard against an overly liberal conception of the free 
trade area’ and oppose ‘any customs union of the classic type’.12 
The Dutch labour deputy Hein Vos was entrusted to write a report on the FTA for 
the Socialist Group. He stated that: ‘socialists must always highlight that the liberal 
doctrine of free trade is not an end in itself. Socialist policy can only be a dirigiste 
policy’. Defending his view at the Council of Europe, he said, ‘we should be aware of 
the dangers that go with free trade’. It had proved no shield against depression, 
unemployment or inflation: ‘We need a lot of instruments to shape our economic 
and social policies’; and, ‘in the treaty on the common market the possibilities for a 
real planned economy are laid down’. These, he claimed, could only come to fruition 
in a community that did not require unanimous decision-making.13 He emphasised 
the socialist potential to build an active community social policy based on institu-
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tions set up by the Treaties of Rome – including the European Social Fund to retrain 
workers, the European Investment Bank to provide capital for disadvantaged regions 
and the EEC’s supranational programmes in agriculture. 
Vos concluded that the British FTA proposal would be good for productivity and 
Western political unity but bad for economic stability and the community’s social 
structure. He recommended that socialists support the FTA but with a stronger 
‘institutional structure’ that would transform the FTA into a ‘European Economic 
Association’.14 If we dig into the details of Vos’s proposals and the Socialist Group’s 
published resolution, their vision of an acceptable FTA begins to appear a lot like 
the Common Market; they included, among other institutions, a Social Fund, an 
investment fund, an agreement on organising agricultural markets, and rules on 
competition enforced by common authorities.15 
Painting Gaullism red
Charles de Gaulle’s caustic termination of the EEC-FTA negotiations in November 
1958 put this discussion on hold but the inter-socialist dispute about Britain and 
European integration nonetheless proved resilient. With an FTA agreement with the 
EEC no longer in prospect, the UK’s Conservative government, led by Harold 
Macmillan, then became a founding member of EFTA, in 1960, but soon afterwards 
it applied to join the EEC in 1961. The reaction of European socialist parliamentari-
ans to the British application was almost exactly the same as it had been when 
considering British membership and/or a free-trade agreement in 1955-57.
Meeting amidst rumours of a pending British application, the SPD’s Willi 
Birkelbach, President of the Socialist Group, opened a meeting by saying that 
British accession would be ‘an extraordinary political success’. However, he then 
went on to lay out a series of community features ‘which no negotiations, even with 
Great Britain, can be permitted to weaken’. Van Naters remarked that British 
commentators only emphasised the economic advantages of joining the EEC, 
ignoring the goal of European unity. He feared that ‘UK accession to the EEC will 
have a paralysing effect’ on the community, while his colleague Henk Vredeling 
reminded the group that in a series of issue areas, member-state socialists ‘have 
continuously demanded measures that go beyond the current clauses of the treaty’. 
A Belgian Socialist, Georges Bohy, wondered aloud whether the UK government 
sincerely wanted to join the EEC. Warning that it would undermine the EEC’s 
political ambitions, he called for postponing British accession.16
In the wake of Prime Minister Macmillan’s announcement on 31 July 1961 of his 
government’s intention to apply to the EEC, comments made by Labour Party leaders 
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in the House of Commons exacerbated these concerns. The Labour Party abstained 
on a motion to support the British application, though the Trade Unions Congress 
was more supportive. On 10 August Macmillan’s government formally applied to the 
EEC (accompanied by a long list of conditions for EEC governments to address 
before the UK might join). A Socialist Group information document summarising 
statements in the Commons noted Labour’s rejection of direct elections and 
European federation, and Harold Wilson’s embrace of the Gaullist idea of a ‘Europe 
of Nations’.17 At the moment of the first British application, the Labour Party and 
socialist members of the European parliament appeared as divided as ever. 
In September, there was an exchange of views between the Socialist Group and the 
Labour Party’s Michael Stewart and other non-EEC socialists on a potential EEC 
enlargement to Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the UK. Nederhorst gave an intro-
ductory speech warning that the accession negotiations could be exploited to 
transform the common market into a mere free trade area. If this were to occur, ‘it 
would mean a return to neoliberalism and would compromise the real possibilities 
of a planning of economic development’. ‘Full employment and economic expan-
sion’, he continued, ‘can only be preserved if the Common Market is directed by an 
Executive equipped with powers that previously lay with national governments’. 
Referring to recent British debates, he complained that ‘a number of Labour Party 
deputies defended points of view in the House of Commons that, on the continent, 
are only shared by reactionary forces’. The continental socialists who were most 
engaged in the European communities had reached an unhappy conclusion in the 
early 1960s: Labour Party leaders shared more in common with the European vision 
of Charles de Gaulle than they did with social democrats in EEC countries.
Europe without Britain
What are we to make of this inter-socialist dispute over the Common Market from 
the vantage point of 2019? The debates of the 1950s-60s appear particularly relevant 
given the international left’s return to emphasising the importance of national 
sovereignty in recent years. Academic scholarship has followed intriguing parallels 
with contemporary politics, with historians arguing that neoliberalism in its modern 
post-war form has been anything but ‘laissez-faire’.18 Neoliberals were eager to build 
international institutions with their own regulations and institutions, shielded from 
the reach of national authorities elected with democratic mandates. As this article 
reminds us, however, the EEC Treaty received both support and opposition in all 
major ideological groups in the 1950s. Liberals, Conservatives and Socialists could 
all invoke different treaty articles and interpretations in support of their own desired 
futures. 
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One of the ironies that should not be lost in today’s Brexit debate is that continental 
socialists were right to fear the influence of the UK – including its Labour Party – on 
the evolving constitution of the EU. The neoliberal elements of the European 
Community became stronger over time, and the socialist elements weaker, in part 
due to the influence of the UK’s forty-plus years of membership. 
Returning to Bevan’s ‘Back to the Jungle’, it is certainly plausible to argue that 
continental socialists were grasping at socialist straws in a (neo)liberal treaty, due to 
their failure to build socialism in their own countries. Looked at from another angle, 
however, one could argue that the Labour Party’s position before and after the UK’s 
accession in 1973 – half-heartedly echoing Conservative and Liberal understandings 
of British trade and world power – undermined the efforts of continental left parties 
to activate the socialist potential of the EEC. The lesson for today is clear. Even in 
absenting itself from the vital forums of European political life, the British Labour 
Party can have an outsized influence on what takes place within them: for good or ill.
Brian Shaev is Lecturer in History at Leiden University.
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